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In pursuit of the rarest of birds:  
an interview with Gilbert Faccarello 
 
GILBERT JEAN FACCARELLO (Paris, 1950) is professor of economics at 
Université Panthéon-Assas, Paris, and a member of the Triangle research 
centre (École Normale Supérieure de Lyon and CNRS). He is presently 
chair of the ESHET Council (European Society for the History of 
Economic Thought).  
He completed his doctoral research in economics at Université       
de Paris X Nanterre. He has previously taught at the Université de Paris-
Dauphine, Université du Maine and École Normale Supérieure de 
Fontenay/Saint-Cloud (now École Normale Supérieure de Lyon). He is a 
co-founder of The European Journal of the History of Economic Thought, 
which he co-edited for 20 years with J. L. Cardoso, Heinz D. Kurz, and A. 
Murphy. With Alain Béraud, he edited the Nouvelle histoire de la pensée 
économique (La Découverte, 3 volumes, 1992-2000) and, together with 
Heinz D. Kurz, he is presently editing a Handbook of the History of 
Economic Analysis (3 volumes, forthcoming with Edward Elgar). 
EJPE interviewed Gilbert Faccarello about his research career in the 
history of economic thought, where he has focused especially on old 
and new classical and Marxian political economy, and French political 
economy during the 18th and 19th centuries. G. Faccarello discusses his 
interest not only in the logical structure and context of the economic 
ideas of past thinkers but also the links between economic thought, 
philosophy, and religion. 
 
EJPE: Professor Faccarello, you did your PhD in economics but you 
have specialized in the history of economic thought. How is it that  
you first became interested in historical questions? Were there any 
scholars who particularly influenced your intellectual development? 
 
GILBERT FACCARELLO: I did my PhD in economics but this heading      
in France includes the many sub-disciplines of economics, including the 
history of economic thought. It is true that my master’s degree was in 
international economics, but my doctoral thesis, defended in 1979 and 
published in a revised form in 1983, was on ‘Labour, value and prices:   
a critique of the theory of value’.  
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You must realize that, when I was studying economics it was still  
the time of the capital controversy between the two Cambridges, i.e., the 
time of a fierce critique of the neoclassical aggregate production 
function and the related theory of distribution. This critique was 
principally associated with a strong neo-Ricardian revival after            
the publication of Sraffa’s Production of commodities by means of 
commodities in 1960. As a consequence questions were also raised about 
the status of Keynes’s writings and Keynesian theory, not only vis-à-vis 
the marginalist approach but also in relation to Sraffa’s work and     
neo-Ricardian developments. Finally, all this rekindled the debates 
around Marx’s theory, especially about the theory of labour value       
and the problem of the transformation of labour values into prices of 
production—and of course, in this case also, about the Marxian theory 
of distribution and the alleged law of the falling rate of profit.  
Thus, at that time, economic theory, history of economic thought, 
and methodology were intimately intertwined. Consider that this was 
also the period when Paul Samuelson started to publish papers in     
HET. My doctoral thesis reflected this general mood. It dealt with        
the different attempts which had been made by many authors—from 
Smith to Sraffa and the neo-Ricardians, via Ricardo, Marx, Dmitriev, 
Bortkiewicz, etc.—to establish links between the concepts of labour, 
value and prices, attempts which were almost always coupled with the 
defence of specific theories of income distribution. I tried to understand 
why none of the links which were proposed could withstand critique.   
In my opinion this meant that this question of the links was not 
correctly posed, probably because the basic concepts had not           
been defined properly. These concepts, in particular the concept of 
labour—e.g., ‘abstract labour’ and ‘socially necessary labour’ in Marx—
had thus to be reconsidered and redefined. All these points naturally 
entailed methodological and philosophical issues. For example, in the 
case of Marx this led me to reconsider his supposed links with Hegel,   
to examine precisely what Marx had borrowed from the Wissenschaft  
der Logik and Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts and why it was 
necessary for him to do so. I thus tried to disentangle three different 
strands in Marx’s discourse, what may be termed the technological, 
sociological, and dialectical. Marx no doubt thought that these lines of 
thought were complementary and necessary for his intellectual project. 
But I reached the conclusion that they were actually in conflict with each 
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other because, among other things, they entailed different and 
conflicting concepts of ‘abstract labour’.  
During all these formative years, I benefited of course from 
extensive reading, especially in English, Italian, and also German—the 
literature in the French language was very poor, to say the least, and not 
only in HET but throughout economics in general. Reading Sraffa and 
some papers from the Cambridge controversy in the seminar run by my 
supervisor Gilbert Abraham-Frois—who subsequently published a book 
with Edmond Berrebi, Theory of value, prices and accumulation—was 
exciting. Geoffrey Harcourt’s book, Some Cambridge controversies in the 
theory of capital, which had just been published, was also important for 
us, together with those of Maurice Dobb, Ronald Meek, and John Hicks.  
On the Marxian side, I was very dissatisfied with the traditional 
Marxist literature. I found the way in which Marx was read and 
commented upon totally uncritical and uninteresting. I was looking     
for new approaches. A short paper by Hans-Georg Backhaus on the 
‘Dialektik der Wertform’ (1967), and a book by Helmut Reichelt, Zur 
logischen Struktur des Kapitalbegriffs bei Karl Marx (1970) were of great 
interest together with some works by Isaak Illych Rubin, especially his 
Essays on Marx’s theory of value, an incomplete German translation of 
which I bought in Berlin in 1974; I subsequently bought the German 
1975 translation of a debate between Rubin and S. A. Bessonow, 
Dialektik der Kategorien. Once back in Paris, I suggested a complete 
French translation of the Essays to colleagues in charge of the journal 
Critiques de l’économie politique, published by the left wing publishing 
house of François Maspero. It came out in 1978, translated by Jean-
Jacques Bonhomme, after the English translation by Milos Amardzija 
and Fredy Perlman published by Black and Red, Detroit, 1972. 
Subsequently Rubin’s History of economic thought was published in 
English with Ink Links in 1979. I am glad that there is now a kind          
of Rubin revival, in Russia, Germany, and Japan where publications of 
some of Rubin’s manuscripts came out recently. As usual, France is 
unfortunately lagging behind.  
On the Italian side the debates were lively and generated an 
impressive number of papers and books. I benefited a lot from           
the writings by Claudio Napoleoni, for example, and I also remember the 
publication of an Italian translation of a series of essays by Ladislaus 
von Bortkiewicz, edited by Luca Meldolesi (Einaudi 1971). But the 
greatest influence probably came from Lucio Colletti, an Italian 
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philosopher whose book Il marxismo e Hegel (1969) impressed me a lot; 
his long introduction to Marx’s Early Writings (1975) was also of great 
interest. In particular, he showed clearly why Engels’s line of thought 
was not only irrelevant but also a highly misleading guide to the 
interpretation of Marx’s writings; and how Marx’s own position was 
much deeper and more complex than was usually claimed. But Colletti, 
like Rubin, did not go so far as to radically criticize Marx’s discourse—
and that is precisely what I tried to do, re-evaluating Ludwig Feuerbach’s 
approach at the same time. Feuerbach was not only essential to     
Marx’s youthful critique of Hegel’s philosophy; Marx also accepted 
Feuerbach’s definition of abstraction and made decisive use of it in     
his characterization of the concept of money and in one of his most 
interesting definitions of abstract labour. 
 
You teach a seminar class on ‘Methods in the history of economic 
thought’. What is your perspective on the methodology of HET? 
 
On this point I am a kind of anarchist. I do not think that there is only 
one way to do good research in HET. It is true that I have always rejected 
the retrospective ‘Whig’ approach as sterile and irrelevant. I have always 
been in favour of historical methods, with the condition of course that 
the links between economic theories and their historical ‘contexts’, their 
intellectual environments—philosophical, religious, political—be taken 
seriously and not treated as merely a kind of decorative but inessential 
wallpaper. But this delimits a very broad field. Specific historical 
methods and approaches are numerous—including the good old history 
of theories—and you are free to choose which one suits you best.          
It all depends on what you would like to study. Just show me your 
results: only the novelty and the quality of the results are important,  
not the road you take to reach them. 
In this respect I think that simple oppositions between internalist/ 
absolutist and externalist/relativist approaches, or between rational  
and historical reconstructions—do you know of any ‘irrational 
reconstructions’?—are rather superficial. If we would like to reflect on 
our own practices as historians of economic thought—and I do not deny 
that this is useful and even necessary—we must face up to much more 
complicated and complex problems. We are unavoidably embedded in   
a particular historical horizon, as are the authors and works we are 
analyzing. One of the first things to do then is to try to determine what 
are the precise meanings of concepts like ‘explain’, ‘understand’, and 
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‘interpret’—and also what is a ‘text’ or a ‘work’. To put it briefly, 
economists and especially historians of economic thought should take 
into account the history and developments of hermeneutics since at 
least Friedrich Schleiermacher and Wilhelm Dilthey, and particularly the 
writings of Hans-Georg Gadamer and Paul Ricœur—not to speak of     
the numerous debates they raised, for example with Jürgen Habermas. 
In my opinion this is a fundamental task.  
On the other hand, insisting too much on ‘method’ presents two 
dangers. The first is to think that adopting a particular ‘correct’ method 
is an infallible path to wonderful results. This is doubly misleading 
because, first of all, committing to one method does not ipso facto 
provide any guarantee of success. Good research also depends on 
chance, coincidence, accidents, and above all on one essential element 
which cannot be taught: scientific imagination. Second, sticking to a 
single method can be paralyzing, especially for young scholars. In this 
respect we should bear in mind Montesquieu’s warning: “vous ne 
pouvez plus être occupé à bien dire, quand vous êtes sans cesse effrayé 
par la crainte de dire mal”.1 Nietzsche said the same thing in substance: 
don’t ask yourself what is the best way to climb the mountain, just 
climb!2 
The second danger is dogmatism and intolerance. Those who are 
imprisoned by strict rules are sometimes led to despise any other 
approach and to become involved in sterile polemics on the subject. 
Unfortunately we are sometimes confronted in HET with the same 
sectarian attitudes we find in other fields of economics, where 
colleagues almost religiously follow one line of thought and 
excommunicate all who do not. This reminds me of Armande’s speech 
in Molière’s Femmes savantes: “Nul n’aura de l’esprit, hors nous et     
nos amis”!3 
When I studied the theories of Boisguilbert and Marx I felt             
the necessity to combine an analytical approach with historical and 
philosophical point of views. This was the only way, in my opinion, to 
reconstruct the coherence of these authors, to make the full complexity 
                                                 
1 “You can no longer be engaged in speaking or writing well, when you are constantly 
afraid of impropriety”—Defence of the spirit of the laws, part III (free translation).  
2 “Wie komm’ ich am besten den Berg hinan? Steig nur hinauf und denk nicht dran!”—
Die fröliche Wissenschaft.  
3 Molière, Les femmes savantes (The learned ladies)—Act 3, scene 2. Armande: “We, by 
our laws, shall judge of all new works; / We’ll rule both prose and verse, whatever’s 
writ; / Except our friends and us, none shall have wit; / We’ll spy out faults in 
everything and find / None but ourselves to write in style refined”. 
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of their theories and beliefs intelligible. When I studied the historical 
reception and dissemination in France of the writings and ideas of 
Adam Smith (with Philippe Steiner) or David Ricardo (with Alain Béraud), 
we adopted a more historical approach but without giving up the 
analytical point of view. The analytical approach is in turn predominant 
in my work on the history of public economics in France, and in my 
study of Ricardo’s theory of international trade.  
 
What about your seminar on ‘Methods in the history of economic 
thought’? 
 
My ‘séminaire de méthode’ does not really deal with ‘methods’ in the 
history of economic thought. Maybe the name is ambiguous. It is more 
modest in its aims: a seminar where students can learn how to read 
texts in a critical way.  
To learn how to critically read a text is in no way superfluous,         
at least in France. During their prior studies, most students are 
accustomed to just working to pass exams, and to pass exams you      
are supposed to know what you have learned. In this seminar I try to 
make them realize that the attitude of a researcher is precisely           
the opposite: research starts when you recognize ‘I do not understand’. 
They do not have to be afraid of speaking in this way, even when they 
read texts by prestigious authors.  
We read and comment on works from different periods, for example 
the controversy between Bodin and Malestroict on the links between 
money of account, species, and prices—in the original version; 
Bernoulli’s 1738 paper on his new theory of the measurement of risk, 
sometimes confronting different translations; or Keynes’s 1911 review 
of Fisher’s Purchasing power of money together with the first section, on 
the quantity theory of money, of chapter 3 of his Tract on monetary 
reform, etc. The analysis of these texts is driven by very simple 
questions: Against whom is the author writing? Which thesis is           
put forth? What is the structure of the argumentation? Is it convincing, 
and why? We pay attention to the vocabulary employed and its      
special meaning in a specific theoretical, historical or philosophical 
context—even if the meaning of words seems obvious at first sight. All 
this shows the students how careful a reading ought to be. On specific 
subjects—Boisguilbert or Smith for example—I or an invited speaker    
go deeper into the links between philosophy and the development of 
economic thought. We also spend some time examining the material 
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aspects of the documents—hence our use of the original 16th century 
version of the Malestroict/Bodin texts.  
In order to widen their horizons, I also recently began inviting young 
scholars who are writing a PhD thesis to attend some specialized 
conferences in HET, even if the topic is far from their own research.   
For example, at the conference on ‘New developments on Ricardo and 
the Ricardian traditions’ that we organized last September in Lyon 
together with the Ricardo Society Japan, the day before the conference 
opening was devoted to a series of lectures on various aspects of 
Ricardo’s thinking to prepare the invited students for the conference 
sessions. The results were very positive and I plan to repeat the exercise. 
I think this kind of thing is an excellent complement to the annual 
European Summer School in the History of Economic Thought.  
There is one point however over which I still quarrel with students. 
Although I distribute the texts in the form of PDFs, I urge students not 
to read them on the screen of their computer or tablet but to print them 
out and use a simple pencil to annotate them assiduously with their 
remarks, questions, and the like, as they read and re-read them. But I am 
afraid my arguments in this regard do not seem to be totally convincing! 
I know that annotation functions in electronic readers are improving, 
but they still lack the necessary flexibility to be really useful. 
 
What do you think is the aim of the history of economic thought as  
an academic discipline? Does it contribute to the understanding of 
contemporary economics by researchers and students? 
 
The history of economic thought is first of all a sub-discipline of its 
own, à part entière, like labour or monetary economics. We do not have 
to apologize for being researchers in HET, nor feel guilty for the 
aesthetic pleasure we feel when reading ‘ancient’ texts. It is true that 
this does not contribute directly to solving contemporary problems, 
though it can suggest ideas for further theoretical elaboration. But it 
certainly helps us to understand those problems in a deeper way, and 
contemporary economic theory and concepts in general.  
Moreover a solid training in HET provides an antidote to the narrow 
purely technical and mathematical training that most students now 
receive in schools and universities. I am not at all against formalization 
and the use of technical tools. But training in economics cannot be 
confined to this kind of technical approach without generating a loss   
of contact with reality and the pressing problems of today. When I look 
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at the content of many of the professional journals in the faculty library, 
I feel that we are back in the heyday of Scholasticism when Schoolmen 
were bitterly debating how many angels could dance on the head of       
a pin… Of course, those Schoolmen were convinced that this was an 
essential activity for the advancement of knowledge and the common 
good; just as some economic ‘theoreticians’ today! 
A training in HET is all the more necessary because students       
(and teachers) are also usually highly specialized by topic and thus 
unable to reason on subjects outside of their precisely defined field of 
competence. HET can open new horizons, and that can help one to think 
in a more comprehensive and critical way. In this perspective—
paraphrasing Keynes—the study of HET is a necessary preliminary to 
the emancipation of the economist’s mind. It allows one to see the 
analogies but also the differences with past events and controversies. 
And this is not superfluous. It is astonishing to see old ideas being put 
forth again and again in various guises, in public debates as well as in 
research papers. To take just two academic examples, economists would 
have had a better idea of the supposed novelty of the ideas Milton 
Friedman developed in his celebrated 1968 paper on ‘The role of 
monetary policy’ had they read Dennis Robertson; and the phenomena 
of adverse selection ‘discovered’ a few decades ago would have seemed 
rather less radical if some striking passages on banking activity and   
the fixation of interest rate limits in the Wealth of nations had been 
seriously studied.  
It is significant that after every crisis the public, the press and even 
economists suddenly show some interest in economic history and HET. 
This was the case recently following the subprime crisis, when the social 
and professional status of economists and financiers was seriously 
shaken. They were accused of having developed useless—or even 
dangerous—models and practices, and of being quite wrong in their 
forecasts. Even Queen Elisabeth II noticed this, and she asked the right 
question on the occasion of her 2008 visit to the London School of 
Economics: why did no one see it coming? 
But unfortunately this interest in HET did not last, except perhaps 
for a renewed attention to the writings of Keynes without any practical 
consequence, at least for the time being. Most people tend to be 
forgetful again once a crisis seems over and they are happy to go     
back to their old daily routines. When I was a student, we discussed    
the respective merits of Kuhn, Lakatos, and Feyerabend regarding the 
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sociology and methodology of science and the structure of scientific 
revolutions. I confess that I preferred the way Lakatos dealt with these 
questions. I realize now that Kuhn was also right, and that                       
I underestimated the strength of the practice of ‘normal science’. “In the 
long run, the economic scholar works for the only coin worth having—
our own [the profession’s] applause”, Samuelson once wrote (1962, 18). 
Alas, this is very true. It is the dark side of the ‘scientific community’.  
It is of course possible to come up with many other excellent 
reasons to study and to teach HET—see for example Mark Blaug’s 2001 
repentance, or Heinz D. Kurz’s 2006 ESHET presidential address. But   
its role in a better understanding of economic concepts and the 
development of a more comprehensive and critical way of thinking 
seems to me essential. 
One hundred and fifty years ago John Stuart Mill stressed              
the necessity of overcoming narrowness in thinking. “If a political 
economist is deficient in general knowledge”, he stated in Auguste 
Comte and positivism, “he will exaggerate the importance and 
universality of the limited class of truths which he knows”. A “liberal 
mental cultivation” is a necessary if not a sufficient remedy “against this 
narrowness [for] a person is not likely to be a good political economist 
who is nothing else” (Mill 1865, 306).  
A few decades later, in his 1924 essay commemorating Marshall, 
Keynes wrote a few sentences along the same lines that are worth 
meditating. Max Planck once told Keynes that he had been interested in 
economics but he had felt that it was too difficult for him. “Professor 
Planck could easily master the whole corpus of mathematical economics 
in a few days”, Keynes commented. “He did not mean that! But the 
amalgam of logic and intuition and the wide knowledge of facts […] 
which is required for economic interpretation in its highest form is, 
quite truly, overwhelmingly difficult” (Keynes 1924, 186n). The way in 
which Keynes detailed the difficulties is worth quoting. Economics, he 
stressed, is not a priori a difficult subject—”compared with the higher 
branches of philosophy and pure science”. This notwithstanding, “good, 
or even competent economists are the rarest of birds. An easy subject, 
at which very few excel!” Why is it so?  
 
The paradox finds its explanation, perhaps, in that the master-
economist must possess a rare combination of gifts. He must reach a 
high standard in several different directions and must combine 
talents not often found together. He must be mathematician, 
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historian, statesman, philosopher—in some degree. He must 
understand symbols and speak in words. He must contemplate the 
particular in terms of the general, and touch abstract and concrete in 
the same flight of thought. He must study the present in the light of 
the past for the purposes of the future (Keynes 1924, 173). 
 
No doubt some will say this is an old-fashioned view, or too 
unattainable a model—or even that Keynes is only describing himself. 
But I presume all will agree that this kind of economist is still today the 
rarest of birds and that the present ways of teaching economics will not, 
to say the least, make them any more common. 
 
Turning to your own research, you often write about early-modern, 
pre-Smithian economic thought. What is it that particularly interests 
you about this period? 
 
Please allow me a remark on your terminology, which is extensively used 
in our discipline. I think that categories like ‘pre-Smithian economic 
thought’ are misleading. Why not ‘pre-Turgotian’, ‘pre-Ricardian’ or  
‘pre-Keynesian’ economic thought? In the case of ‘pre-Smithian 
economics’, it is taken for granted that Smith was the founder of 
political economy and that contemporary economists are “the sons and 
daughters of Adam Smith” (Samuelson 1962, 1). There would be a before 
(non-scientific) and an after (scientific) Smith; a point of view that is 
totally biased and which moreover gives a false image of Smith, as the 
wealth of research published on his work in the last three decades 
demonstrates. I know that the label ‘pre-Smithian economics’ is still 
widely used by historians of economic thought, but this is unfortunate 
and suggests an intellectual inertia, or at least that the results of 
research take a long time to be accepted and integrated into our 
professional language.  
I was (and I am still) particularly interested in the works of 17th and 
18th century authors because, first of all, there is much to study in this 
field. The case was probably a bit different for English or Scottish 
authors, but, when I started to study HET, I realized that as regards 
Continental Europe the publications of that period were either neglected 
or dealt with in terms of the retrospective approach. At best their 
authors were considered as ‘precursors’, i.e., unimportant, just 
curiosities, the only elements of interest in what they wrote being 
precisely those which vaguely foreshadow some theory stated much 
later. This is an incredibly sterile approach which in the end cannot 
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uncover anything new. HET is not the history of a cumulative scientific 
truth which has been reached by discarding errors. It is certainly not  
the study of ‘the wrong opinions of dead men’.  
My aim was instead to take these authors seriously and to 
reconstruct their thinking as completely as it is possible to do in our 
own historical horizon, paying much attention to their historical and 
philosophical environment. What was needed was to reconstruct the 
logic and coherence of their arguments. A typical example is the work of 
Pierre Le Pesant de Boisguilbert who was only considered as a precursor 
of Quesnay; or even Turgot—an extraordinary theoretical mind, who     
is himself still all too frequently mentioned only as a ‘dissenting 
Physiocrat’, which does not mean anything. Not to speak of Jean-Joseph-
Louis Graslin, Alexandre Vandermonde or even Ferdinando Galiani.   
This did not exclude research on more specific points. I tried for 
example to show how the debates between Turgot, Galiani, and Necker 
were politically and theoretically significant because they discussed, 
with valuable arguments on both sides, the difficult problem of how to 
design a successful economic policy in the context of the transition 
from a regulated to a free market economy. That was a very rich debate. 
Ironically enough, approximately the same questions were topical again 
quite recently, after the collapse in Eastern Europe of the political and 
economic regimes of the USSR and the so-called ‘People’s democracies’.  
I tried also to show how Vandermonde, while not a first rank 
theoretician, had nevertheless been important during the French 
Revolution, paving the way to Say’s and Destutt de Tracy’s concept       
of productivity.  
Another powerful reason to study seriously these 17th and 18th 
century (but also more ancient) authors lies in the complex relationships 
they maintained with, broadly speaking, philosophical ideas. Most of  
the time these ideas are of no minor interest for these authors and 
powerfully motivate the questions they raised and the solutions they 
tried to find. The case of Boisguilbert is striking. His attitude towards 
the Jansenist currents of thought, together with the friendly attitude 
Jansenists had towards Cartesian physics, allow us to reconstruct in      
a better way his approach and results. Another striking example is 
Graslin. His Essai analytique sur la richesse et sur l’impôt (1767)—and his 
Dissertation of Saint-Petersburg (1768), for the few commentators who 
were aware of it—always raised a serious problem of interpretation.   
His writings have generally been considered to be important, but 
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commentators have never agreed on the reasons for that—and this is 
what happened in the case of Boisguilbert’s writings, too. Whence a very 
vague image of Graslin as a ‘forerunner’ of just about everybody—again, 
like Boisguilbert. In order to find out what he was really about, I tried to 
combine intellectual history and an analytical approach. This allowed 
me to see how Graslin based his approach on ideas borrowed from  
Jean-Jacques Rousseau—especially from his Discours sur l’origine et les 
fondements de l’inégalité parmi les hommes (1755)—and sensationist 
philosophers like Maupertuis or Charles Bonnet. It was then fascinating 
for me to uncover how Graslin tried to develop a kind of Rousseauist 
political economy and how his construction can also be considered as 
the foundation of classical political economy—in the sense that it entails 
a theory of the natural prices of commodities based on the ‘conditions 
of production’ and a theory of market prices as ‘gravitating’ around 
these natural prices, a special case being a labour theory of value. It was 
also interesting to see how and why, like some of his contemporaries—
Condorcet for instance—Graslin paid great attention to certain 
questions of public economics like market failures and the free rider 
problem, or how he distinguished complementary from substitutive 
goods. 
For those who are interested in the multiple links between economic 
theory and philosophy, this period is central. This is not to say, of 
course, that these links disappeared afterwards and that economics 
finally became an autonomous science mimicking the model of physics. 
The old thesis of a progressive independence of economic theory        
vis-à-vis philosophy, politics and religion—which Louis Dumont tried to 
revive in the 1970s in his Homo æqualis—cannot be accepted. To believe 
that economic theory became a science through cutting away at any kind 
of link with philosophy, politics and religion—‘freeing’ itself from    
them and the intellectual environment out of which it progressively 
emerged—remains a kind of fundamental illusion. While more discreet, 
those links are still there, and of material importance. With Philippe 
Steiner I have tried to show how political economy presented itself as a 
new political philosophy. Succeeding centuries of domination by religion 
on behaviours and thoughts, it imposed a new ethos, a new ‘conduct of 
life’ to use Max Weber’s phrase. This is what we called ‘philosophie 
économique’. 
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Could you explain what this phrase ‘philosophie économique’ means 
and why it is so interesting to you? 
 
As you know, in the specific intellectual context of 18th century France, 
almost every intellectual was said to be a ‘philosophe’, i.e., a person who 
thought freely and against prejudices and worked for the advancement 
of science and truth. Quesnay and the Physiocrats were known as the 
‘économistes’ or ‘philosophes économistes’. They were seen by many   
as philosophers who had not only developed a new science but also 
subverted the traditional wisdom for the counselling of the government 
of a state because they put the ‘science de l’économie politique’ or 
‘science économique’ at the centre of the legislator’s concerns. In fact 
they proposed a new political philosophy based on a new ethics.  
This attitude was labelled ‘philosophie économique’ by some 
contemporary authors. The phrase was first coined in 1767 by Nicolas 
Baudeau, the founder of the Éphémérides du citoyen—which became the 
organ of Physiocracy—and who is also noted for having called Quesnay 
the ‘European Confucius’. It appeared first in the Éphémérides and    
then in a book probably written at the same period but only published 
in 1771, Première introduction à la philosophie économique ou analyse 
des États policés. It was also picked up by Gabriel Bonnot de Mably, who 
was critical of this kind of discourse. The attitude of Quesnay and the 
Physiocrats was not new. It started with Boisguilbert some decades 
before, was also Turgot’s, and was continued by Paul Thiry d’Holbach, 
Claude-Adrien Helvetius, and Jean-Baptiste Say. This new approach to 
politics, ethics, and society—this new political philosophy—was both 
positive and normative and tried to impose a new ‘conduct of life’ 
favouring the development of a market economy and the accumulation 
of capital. To express this we tried to build an ideal-type along Weberian 
lines. It is this ideal-type we chose to call ‘philosophie économique’ 
because we thought this was the best contemporary expression.            
In constructing it we focused on three elements: a self-interested 
conception of human behaviour; a theory of knowledge essentially 
based on sensationism; and a peculiar attitude to the Legislator which 
evolved through time. We have developed our idea in two co-authored 
papers. 
Weber himself wrote that the relevance of the ideal-type he 
developed in his studies on Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist      
des Kapitalismus stopped at around the end of the 17th century.            
It seemed to us that, in France, from that date to the period of the 
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Restoration—i.e., the beginning of the 19th century—our new ideal-type 
was useful in understanding the fundamental changes in the political, 
ethical and philosophical ideas that characterised the period. 
 
Your best-known and most-cited book deals with the economic 
writings of Pierre de Boisguilbert, whom you have already mentioned 
several times. Marx called him one of the founders of classical 
political economy, together with William Petty. How important was 
Boisguilbert’s work to the development of modern economics? 
 
Marx was certainly a poor historian of economic thought, simply 
because he was not interested in HET per se. His approach is totally 
retrospective. He almost always judged the authors who wrote before 
him by a sole criterion: did they foreshadow or anticipate his own 
theory? Were they his ‘predecessors’ or not, and on which points? 
Classical political economy, according to him, included the works of all 
those who tried to understand the real production relationships in a 
capitalist society, i.e., to describe what happens behind the curtain of 
the market, unveiling what is hidden. And ‘vulgar economists’—those 
who were satisfied dealing with mere appearances—were in his view the 
apologists of the system. Stated as such, this is a rather vague criterion. 
Something had to be added. The touchstone was in fact the labour 
theory of value. As he put it in Zur Kritik der Politischen Ökonomie 
(1859), Petty in England and Boisguilbert in France initiated the scientific 
movement on this point which led to Ricardo and himself. This is         
of course an inaccurate statement: I cannot see any reference to or 
‘anticipation’ of a labour theory of value in Boisguilbert. On the contrary 
he developed an account based on the interaction of demand and supply 
in markets and, on this basis, determined a system of relative 
equilibrium prices he called ‘prix de proportion’.  
In Theorien über der Mehrwert (1862-1863)—where, if I am not 
mistaken, Boisguilbert is referred to only once—Marx maintained      
that Boisguilbert was a forerunner of the Physiocrats who, in his      
view, showed that the “surplus value” was created in the sphere of 
production—even if this sphere was limited to agriculture—and not in 
the sphere of circulation. But there is nothing similar in Boisguilbert.  
In fact what Marx found of greatest interest in Boisguilbert were his 
thoughts on money. The greatest number of references to Boisguilbert  
is to be found in Grundrisse (1857-1858), Zur Kritik (1859) and the 1858 
primitive version of it, and they concern precisely this theme. Marx is 
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attracted by the many passages where Boisguilbert violently stressed  
the damaging effects of the passion for money, gold, and hoards, and 
insisted that money, which should only have been the servant of trade 
in its functions of measure of value and medium of exchange, became 
its tyrant in its role of a store of value and as a consequence contributed 
to generating crises. It is on this aspect that Marx contrasted English 
and French (classical) political economy—Petty and Boisguilbert—an 
opposition that, he wrote, was a lasting one because it was still to be 
found between Ricardo and Sismondi. Contrary to Boisguilbert who was 
supposed to fight money, stressing repeatedly that genuine wealth 
consisted in the amount of commodities produced and not species, 
Petty was said to praise gold and the love of money because of their 
beneficial consequences for economic growth and the extension of 
markets.  
Notwithstanding Marx’s flawed interpretation, Boisguilbert was 
important in the development of political economy. On the basis of     
his religious belief and his stress on the Fall and Original Sin, he put the 
depraved, selfish, maximizing behaviour of agents at the centre of his 
analysis of the functioning of interdependent markets. From this 
conception of agents, together with their information and expectations, 
he determined the conditions of an optimal equilibrium of the economy, 
the ‘état d’opulence’, and proposed a laissez-faire policy—‘liberté du 
commerce’—and a limited role for the State (justice, police and defence). 
This equilibrium—he used the term—is characterized by a system        
of relative prices, the ‘prix de proportion’ already alluded to. Absolute 
prices and the quantity of money in circulation do not play any decisive 
role in his analysis. Money as a circulating medium is for the most part 
endogenous: Boisguilbert thought his contemporaries were wrong        
to believe that the quantity of specie was too low and a cause of crisis. 
The fact that money does not circulate is not the cause of but a 
consequence of a crisis, the real causes of which are to be found 
elsewhere—essentially in bad economic and fiscal policy and the 
regulation of markets. Boisguilbert also analyzed possible destabilizing 
shocks and how a crisis could develop in one sector of the economy, 
especially agriculture, and then spread to the other sectors and become 
general. He also developed a circular flow approach in order to take into 
account the economic role of rentiers and the State.  
These themes formed the legacy that Quesnay and the Physiocrats 
on the one hand, and Turgot and sensationist political economy           
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on the other, took up in two rather complementary ways. In my  
opinion, however, Turgot, by substituting sensationist philosophy for 
Boisguilbert’s theological point of departure in explaining the behaviour 
of agents, was the one who developed this intellectual legacy the most 
rigorously and farthest.  
Coming back to Marx: he did not properly understand some French 
17th century vocabulary—for example ‘finance’ and ‘financiers’—and 
this explains some of his judgments. Moreover he worked on a faulty 
edition of Boisguilbert (the Daire edition, published in the celebrated 
Collection des principaux économistes in 1842). We had to wait for       
the beautiful 1966 INED edition of the works and correspondence         
of Boisguilbert by Jacqueline Hecht, including a substantial number of 
previously unpublished manuscripts, to get a better understanding      
of this architectonic author. 
 
Except for your work on the 19th century, most of your publications 
deal with French economists or economists who wrote in 
France/French. Do you think that, in describing the rise and 
development of modern economics, there exists a bias towards        
the British contribution? If so, why is the French contribution 
underestimated? 
 
There is certainly—or rather there was, because it seems that things   
are now changing again—a bias in favour of English-writing authors. 
This bias came strongly to the fore after World War II. If you look back 
to the 19th century or the beginning of the 20th, scholars paid         
more attention than today to what happened in different countries.     
As Samuelson remembered (1962, 3): “When I began graduate study at 
Harvard in 1935, Schumpeter rather shocked me by saying in a lecture 
that of the four greatest economists in the world, three were French”. 
Well, it is true that Schumpeter came from Austria, but his case is not 
isolated. Things changed in a decisive way with the acceleration of      
the professionalization of economists after 1945—which gave the USA  
a political and intellectual dominance over economics, as in other fields. 
It was moreover easier for native English-speaking economists—rather 
reluctant to learn other languages or to consider research not written in 
English—to concentrate on their own heritage. This set the tone and in 
other countries many other scholars tended to imitate them and publish 
on the same themes. The great controversies, like the debates on capital 
theory already alluded to, on Keynes, on Ricardo, and so forth, also 
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played an important part in this focusing on Anglophone authors and 
writings. Historians of economic thought are not locked up in ivory 
towers—we also follow fashions and topicality.  
Fortunately there were some exceptions. ‘Big names’ like Quesnay, 
Turgot, Say, Cournot, Dupuit, Walras, Marx, or Pareto always attracted 
some attention. But they remained exceptions. Note that what I just said 
of economists is certainly not true of English-speaking historians who 
never lost a wider perspective.  
To this must be added the fact that, during the last two centuries,    
a great number of first-rank theoreticians, from Ricardo to Keynes, were 
British or American. And as historians of economic thought used to 
understand their discipline as the history of theories, this could explain 
the concentration of research on works published in English and the 
relative neglect of writings and debates in other languages. This is not to 
say that the latter were not studied. But the problem of language was a 
serious impediment to the reception and spread of research findings.  
Two complementary problems which today do not exist any more 
also formed no mean obstacle to wider research. The first were the 
scant possibilities to publish a paper in HET in an Anglo-Saxon journal 
without dealing with subjects which were supposed to be of interest to 
this journal and its narrow range of referees. Now of course the spaces 
for publication are rather numerous, the profession is well organized 
and, thanks to the internet, communication with authors and referees 
from all over the world is incredibly easy. All these transformations over 
the last two or three decades are of material importance and no doubt 
favour the multiplication of subjects, themes and methods in HET.  
The second reason was the simple (un)availability of the texts—the 
more ancient they were, the more difficult they were to find—and, more 
generally, of meta-information about the texts such as would allow 
tracing related works published during a given period. Today, with the 
internet and especially thanks to sites like Gallica (the electronic library 
of the Bibliothèque Nationale de France), Google Books, or Archive.org, 
and many other institutions, researchers can immediately have at their 
disposal a huge number of texts in various languages and all the meta-
information that scholars of my generation could only get after months 
of detective work in libraries. By simply typing some words on your 
keyboard you can find very interesting references that you did not at all 
expect and which widen your horizon. The real challenge now is not to 
get documents and information, but how to manage and make good use 
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of them—and the problem is serious for students starting a research 
project. Of course, this aspect of things depends on the subject: if you 
are studying Keynes’s Treatise on money or the monetary theory of 
Walras, the problem is different. What I would just like to stress here is 
that one can now easily have a better view of the wealth of literature and 
debates in various countries. This is how, a few years ago, I discovered 
the richness of the debates about public economics among 19th century 
French economists, or the huge and highly varied French literature on 
population, poverty, and wealth. 
 
When it comes to 19th and 20th-century economics, you seem to       
be particularly interested in Ricardo, Marx, and Sraffa. Is there a 
philosophical connection between these economists?  
 
No, I do not think there is any philosophical connection between them, 
at least not any deep connection. Ricardo and Marx had different 
approaches. Sraffa owes something to both of them but he was working 
in a totally different intellectual context, well described in some recent 
contributions by Heinz Kurz based on the still unpublished Sraffa 
papers deposited in Trinity College, Cambridge. The only link I can 
imagine between the three of them would be a kind of positivist 
‘scientistic’ attitude. But this is rather superficial a link. 
In fact, after my book and some papers on the topics you mention,   
I did not do any more original research on the 19th century for a long 
time. I was interested in other subjects, and I felt it was not good for me 
to spend too long digging in the same place. Better to come back later, 
with a fresher mind. As we already discussed, I turned to the French 
17th and 18th centuries, but also to the 20th. For the past 15 years,        
I have been teaching a seminar on Keynes—not the Keynes of the 
General theory and after, but the Keynes before 1936, starting with     
his first writings—‘Keynes before Keynes’ is the title.  
However, I have returned to the 19th century in the last few years. 
First to the French 19th century, with papers on the history of public 
economics during this period, on the debates around poverty, 
population and wealth, on the various associationist trends of thought 
and finally on the role of the different religious faiths, old and new,      
in the controversies of the time. Of course Say, Cournot, Dupuit, and 
Walras are well known, but unfortunately research into the French 19th 
century usually only focus on ‘big names’. This is a pity because the 
period is infinitely richer, both analytically and from the point of view  
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of intellectual history. Be they liberals or anti-liberals, conservatives     
or socialists, the variety of opinions is incredible, as is the number of 
subjects they engaged with.  
I am also returning to Ricardo and English classical political 
economy. It is really interesting to read these texts again after so many 
years and to re-discover them from another perspective. Sometimes    
my two 19th centuries connect with each other. For example I just 
published, with Alain Béraud, a study on the reception of Ricardo’s 
writings in France. It was fascinating for us to see how the two worlds 
communicated, and how, why, on which points and by whom Ricardo’s 
ideas were accepted, modified, criticized, or rejected over the following 
six or seven decades, and also how he influenced, directly or indirectly, 
various developments in economic theory on this side of the Channel. 
 
In your research you often pay attention to theological issues. 
Recently you launched a research programme entitled ‘The conflict-
ridden development of modernity: theology and political economy’. 
What does theology have to do with economics? 
 
Religion has been very important at decisive moments in the 
development of political economy. On this topic we usually think 
spontaneously of classical Greece and Scholasticism. But religion       
was still significant, though in a more discreet or even hidden way, from 
the seventeenth century onwards. And this should not be surprising. 
After centuries of religious domination, you cannot expect people to 
suddenly change their mentalities and totally erase the ideas which so 
powerfully shaped their intellectual cultures. Let us take an example. 
Historians of economic thought often quote Petty’s assertion that he 
wanted to reason in terms of ‘number, weight, and measure’, and it is 
taken for granted that it represented the new scientific ethos of the time 
and a break with Scholasticism. It is true that this phrase is often quoted 
by 17th century scientists. But, interestingly enough, it comes from the 
Bible (Wisdom of Solomon, XI, 20-21).  
I was first confronted with religious schemes of thought when 
studying Marx and trying to find the inner logic of his argument. I do 
not allude to the well-known ‘opium of the people’ but to something 
more fundamental. When discussing and trying to logically analyze    
the concepts of commodity, value, money and capital, Marx often     
used religious metaphors which, following Colletti, I proposed to take 
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seriously because they are in my view a key to the correct interpretation 
of many difficult or enigmatic passages in Marx’s writings.  
I was further confronted with theological disputes when I studied 
Boisguilbert. I started to read Boisguilbert by chance—I had to teach a 
course in the history of economic thought and I did not understand 
what I had read about him in the standard histories of economic 
thought. Fortunately I had bought the Hecht edition. I started reading 
and with every page more and more questions came to my mind.       
One thing led to another. I examined the Jansenist controversies of     
the time and found that I could interpret Boisguilbert’s theories as       
an answer to some important questions being raised at that time          
in religious, moral, and political debates. In this case, and quite 
unexpectedly to me, religious ideas and beliefs were of material 
significance in shaping the political economy of free trade.  
And this is not an isolated case. Philippe Steiner (2011) recently 
showed how Hermann Heinrich Gossen was inspired in his theoretical 
research by his religious faith. A decade or two ago, the writings of 
Maurice Potron—a French mathematician and Jesuit who wrote at the 
beginning of the last century—were rediscovered and republished. It is 
amazing to see how his faith and his search for a ‘just price’ could push 
him to elaborate a theory of prices of production and to find a 
mathematical solution for the existence of a system of equilibrium-
relative prices—he used the Perron-Frobenius theorem as early as 1911 
(Bidard, et al. 2009). It is striking too to see how Potron used, without 
knowing his writings, almost the same words as Boisguilbert. To define 
equilibrium prices, Boisguilbert used the condition that “il faut que 
chaque métier nourrisse son maître”: for Potron, it was the translation 
of the prayer “give us this day our daily bread”.  
Religious thinking was also the source of important 19th century 
critiques levelled at liberal political economy by many authors from  
very different points of view—protestant, conservative catholic,     
liberal catholic, and socialist. As a matter of fact many socialist or 
associationist doctrines in France during the first half of the 19th 
century were inspired by religious ideas, old or new; doctrines that Marx 
and Marxists tried to dismiss but which not only played a major role in 
French culture and history, but were also much more important than 
avowed for the development of Marx’s thought itself. It is also 
remarkable to note that the religious critique of liberal political 
economy motivated the foundation of sociology—and later ‘economic 
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sociology’—by Auguste Comte, Émile Durkheim and the Durkeimians, 
and so on, as Steiner (2005) clearly showed in a recent book. And 
coming back to economics, it is fascinating to see that the Protestant 
and Catholic critiques were rather similar at the beginning of the 19th 
century but diverged afterwards and by the end of the century were 
associated with two radically different models of economic and social 
organization—one founded on liberty and association, the other on 
authority and new corporations.  
All this of course runs counter to, or challenges, the famous 
‘secularization thesis’, which has been around for at least 150 years 
though its intellectual foundations are continuously shifting. I am not 
the first, of course, to be interested in this kind of research. But there is 
a need for more systematic study of the role of religious thought in HET. 
This is the reason why I proposed the research programme you mention. 
I also think that an international comparative study is essential in this 
field because the histories of the links between religion and political 
economy are not the same in every country. What happened in France, 
for example, is different from what happened in Great Britain or in the 
United States, Italy, or Germany. I am quite confident that the new 
research this programme will foster will bring interesting results and 
could well change or at least greatly enrich our perception of the history 
of economic thought. 
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